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ABSTRACT 
 
The empirical literature is divided over the issue of whether child care costs are a significant 
barrier to female employment. In this paper we develop a theoretical model that contributes to 
the literature (1) by allocating mother’s time between work, leisure and child care and (2) by 
introducing the possibility of uncertainty in second period income because of a greater 
probability of divorce. We examine how these changes affect decisions on labour supply and 
purchase of child care. We show that although an increase in the price of child care reduces the 
demand for child care, it has an ambiguous impact on female employment decisions. From a 
policy point of view, this implies that government subsidies aimed at mitigating the cost of 
child care, may not have their desired impact in encouraging greater female labour force 
participation. However, an increase in the probability of child care unambiguously increases 
female labour supply and purchase of child care. 
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1. Introduction  
It is often argued that the availability and affordability of child care is 
a significant factor affecting women’s labour supply decisions. 
Traditionally studies on child care have modelled this decision using 
the labour-leisure choice model, assuming that leisure and parental 
child care time are substitutes. Using this framework, it is argued that 
an increase in child care costs leads to a substitution away from work. 
The empirical literature however, is divided over the issue of whether 
child care costs constitute a significant barrier to maternal employment. 
Some authors argue that higher child care costs reduce female labour 
force participation (see Kimmel, 1998; Ribar, 1995; Connelly, 1992; 
Schofield and Polette, 1998; Powell 2002). However, this view is by 
no means universal. Empirical studies from Australia such as 
Vandenheuvel (1996), Teal (1992), the ABS (1999) and Cobb-Clark et 
al (2000) disagree. According to these studies, although the greatest 
demand for formal child care comes for work-related reasons, child 
care costs do not appear to be a factor in limiting the use of child care. 
In Australia, child care has emerged as an important policy issue at a 
time when the labour force participation of married mothers with 
children is at its highest level. According to ABS (1990, 1998a), in 
1966 less than a third of married women aged 15-64 were in the labour 
force. This figure rose to 63 per cent by 1998. However, the 
participation rates of single women aged 15-64 increased by only 1 per 
cent from 66 to 67 per cent during the same period. Furthermore, 
much of the increase in female labour force participation has come 
through an increase in part-time and casual labour. For example, 
females constitute nearly 73 per cent of the part-time labour force (see 
ABS, ). Moreover, time-use surveys indicate that women continue to 
spend a greater proportion of their time in home production than men 
do. Australian women for example, contribute the bulk of unpaid non-
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market work in families, with 78 per cent of all hours spent in home 
production (ABS, 1994).  
Under these conditions accessibility and affordability of child care are 
likely to be important factors affecting women’s labour supply 
decisions (see Olsberg, 1994; Redmond 1999). Since women are more 
inclined to work part-time or casually, they are also more likely to 
experience career breaks leading to a deterioration of skills and greater 
difficulty in re-entering the workforce.  
Hence, it is possible that women with a strong labour market 
attachment may choose not to have any children. Alternatively, the 
high cost of child care may deter some women with children from 
participating in the work force. This is consistent with recent studies 
by Waldfogel (1998), Joshi (1998) and Redmond (1999), which show 
that while greater female labour force participation has contributed to 
a narrowing of the gender wage gap, there still exists a significant 
wage gap between childless women and women with children. These 
studies also point a greater labour market attachment by childless 
women relative to women with children.  
Hence, a fundamental feature of child care policy in Australia has been 
to provide subsidies to child care, in a bid to encourage the labour 
supply of mothers with young children. However, these subsidies are 
typically means-tested and they are by no means only restricted to 
women in the workforce. This leads to a problem where there is excess 
demand for child care relative to supply. Because the subsidy (called 
child care benefits in Australia) is tax-financed, there is a restriction on 
the number of child care places. This creates a situation where women 
often take time from the labour force to care for their children. This 
impacts not just on women’s current income but also on their ability to 
accumulate future retirement income.  
For example in Australia, old-age pensions are based on a two-tier 
system, a combination of a means and assets tested public pension and 
private superannuation savings which depend crucially on labour 
market attachment. Private superannuation savings are accumulated 
through regular contributions from both the employer and the 
employee, with a compulsory minimum employer contribution set 
down by government legislation. People that spend a longer time in 
the workforce are likely to accumulate a greater amount of savings. 
Moreover, these funds cannot be accessed until retirement age. 
However, people on low incomes that do not satisfy the means and 
assets test qualify for an age-pension. Further, divorce rates in 
Australia are among the highest in the world, and this is also likely to 
impact on women’s retirement income, particularly for those who 
withdrew from the labour force to care for their children. Under these 
circumstances, women face a trade-off between spending time with 
their children and current and future earnings. 
In this paper we develop a theoretical model where time is allocated 
between work, leisure and child care. The model analyses how child 
care costs, the wage rate and taxes influence decisions on female 
employment and demand for child care. We adopt a life-cycle 
perspective and examine the implications of current labour supply 
choices on future retirement consumption.  
Our model has an added feature that child care can be provided at 
‘home’ by the mother or purchased from professional child care 
providers. Moreover, home-provided child care and professional care 
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are assumed to be perfect substitutes, and parents also derive utility 
from time spent with their children. Hence, labour force participation 
decisions by women affects not just their current period consumption, 
but also has implications for their potential to accumulate savings for 
retirement. However, their labour market decisions are contingent on a 
combination of labour market returns and on the affordability of child 
care.  
The paper makes two contributions to the existing vast literature on 
child care: (1) we specifically incorporate leisure into the model, so 
that women face a tripartite choice between labour market 
participation, child care and leisure. (2) we introduce uncertainty in 
second period income because of a greater probability of divorce.  
The incorporation of these two features greatly improves the analysis. 
It allows for situations where it is possible for labour supply to 
decrease accompanied by an increase in leisure and an increase in 
child care. Further, the incorporation of second-period uncertainty 
increases the opportunity cost of leisure and child care. Assumining 
that increasing female labour force participation is a desirable goal, the 
policy question then is whether child care subsidies or work-related 
incentives are better at encouraging greater female labour force 
participation.  
We show that although an increase in the price of child care reduces 
demand for child care, it has an ambiguous impact on female labour 
supply decisions. This result is consistent with the ambiguity found in 
the empirical studies. It cannot then be argued that an increase in child 
care costs definitely reduce female labour force participation. From a 
policy point of view, this result suggests that government subsidies to 
child care aimed at encouraging greater female labour force 
participation may not have the desired affect. It may instead lead to a 
reduction in female labour supply and a greater substitution towards 
leisure. However, an increase in uncertainty of second period income 
by increasing the opportunity cost of both leisure and child care leads 
to an increase in labour supply and purchase of child care.  
Further, according to our model, the impact of an increase in the wage 
rate on labour supply and demand for child care is also ambiguous. 
Our model also predicts that in response to an increase in the wage 
rate, it is not possible for labour supply and demand for child care to 
move in opposite directions. Further, an increase in the marginal tax 
rate reduces both incentives to work and demand for child care.  
Our model shows that the incorporation of uncertainty in second-
period income through a greater increse in the probability of divorce, 
unambiguously increases female labour supply and purchase of child 
care. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the next section 
provides the institutional context for the model. We provide some 
summary statistics on child care costs and female labour force in 
Australia. We also discuss recent changes in child care and 
superannuation policies. A two-period model is developed in Section 
3, where women face a tripartite choice between child care, leisure and 
labour force participation. In Section 4 we analyse the comparative 
static properties of the model. Section 5 extends the model by 
incorporating future uncertainty in the form of possibility of divorce 
and finally Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Institutional Context 
In Australia, child care has emerged as an important issue at a time 
when the labour force participation of married mothers with children is 
at its highest level. Child care is defined by the Australian Bureau of 
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Statistics as “arrangements (other than parental care) made for the care 
of children under 12 years of age.” Formal child care is regulated and 
includes attendance at a pre-school, a child care centre, family day 
care or occasional care. Informal care on the other hand includes care 
by family members, friends, neighbours and paid babysitters. Parents 
may use a combination of formal and informal child care (ABS, 1999).  
Child care costs are often cited by women as an important factor 
influencing their labour participation decisions. Recent studies have 
shown that women typically contribute more time to child care than 
men do. Hence their need for childcare is likely to be higher than 
men’s. For example, Bittman’s (1995) study of Australian women 
shows that between 1987 and 1992, women on an average spent three 
and a half times longer in child care than men did. Lower labour force 
participation among women with children is attributed among other 
things to factors such as career breaks experienced by mothers, a 
greater incidence of part-time work in this group, and the high cost of 
child care (see Olsberg, 1994; Redmond 1999). These factors are 
likely to lead to not only lower current income but also to a 
deterioration of skills and lower potential to accumulate pension 
savings for retirement. Hence, it is possible that women with a strong 
labour market attachment may choose not to have any children. 
Alternatively, the high cost of child care may deter some women with 
children from participating in the work force.  
Table 1 summarises female employment trends in Australia for the 
1989-1999 period.  
Two points are worth noting. First females constitute nearly 3/4ths of 
the part-time labour force and of all female employees, 31.8 per cent 
are casually employed. In contrast only 12.5 per cent of male workers 
work part-time. Further, approximately half of all women with 
children in the 0-4 age group participate in the labour market. 
These figures are supported by Chapman et al’s (1999) study using 
NLS data. They find average annual earnings to be the highest for 
women with no children ($18,292), relative to those that had one child 
($13,969) or three children ($9933). This issue is of greater 
significance at a point when we take into account the high probability 
of divorce. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 1999, 
46 per cent of all Australian marriages ended in divorce (ABS, 1999). 
Clare (2001) shows that while currently, married couples constitute 70 
per cent of retired people with 20 per cent and around 20 per cent of 
such households consist of widowed or divorced women. Further, the 
number of divorced women is projected to double over the next twenty 
years. 
The introduction of the Child Care Act in 1972, formalised the federal 
government’s funding of child care. Since then successive 
governments have made several attempts to reform the child care 
sector. 
In 1997, the government introduced several measures including cuts in 
operational subsidies1 to child care centres, a freeze in the fee ceiling 
against which child care assistance is calculated and a cut in the 
number of private child care centres. According to the government, 
these changes were introduced because of concern that child care 
facilities were increasingly being used by non-working individuals. 
                                                 
1 These are subsidies given to alleviate the running costs of child care centres. 
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The government also simultaneously introduced changes to tax 
policies for families. The Family Tax Initiative (FTI) as this was called, 
has two main components: it includes an increase in the tax free 
threshold for families (or single parent) with children. Accordingly, 
the tax free threshold increased by $1000 for one member of a couple 
(or single parent) if taxable income was less than $70,000. The second 
component of the FTI was the provision of an additional tax free area 
of $2500. However, this was only given to single income families with 
low incomes and where at least one child is under the age of five years. 
Families with the same or lower level of total income earned by two 
working parents are not eligible for this benefit (see Brennan, 1998; 
Loane, 1997 for a more details). 
The economic rationale for these policies was that the burden of child 
care should be borne by those who benefit most from it. However, 
these policies are likely to have a greater adverse impact on women 
relative to men. If child care costs act as a deterrent to re-entry into the 
workforce, then an increase in child-care fees due to cuts in 
operational subsidies combined with tax changes, further raise the cost 
of child care whereas the provision of a tax-free threshold for single 
income families acts as a transfer to stay at home parents. Together 
these policies raise the opportunity cost of labour force participation, 
particularly for women. Clare (2001) shows that despite increases in 
female labour force participation, women on an average spend fewer 
years in full-time work. 
Lower labour market attachment by women however, also leads to 
lower accumulation of pension savings for retirement. This factor has 
become an issue as the Australian pension system is a combination of 
work-based superannuation and a basic pension that is income and 
assets tested. Currently superannuation funds are an important source 
of savings for Australian households. According to empirical estimates 
they constitute 15 per cent of the personal wealth of all Australians 
(Bordow and Harrison, 1994). Retirement income in Australia is based 
on a two-tier system which includes an asset and means-tested pension 
and a superannuation scheme that relies on labour force participation. 
The means and assets tested pension is structured as follows: everyone 
above the age of 60 regardless of whether or not they participated in 
the labour market is eligible for a pension. Pension payments are 
however only made to those singles and couples earning below 
$388.30 and $647.80 per week respectively. In 1996 the pension 
amounts were $8733 per annum for single retirees and $14,570 for a 
couple. Currently, the pension level is approximately 40 per cent of the 
average working week (Bateman and Piggott, 1997).  
The work-based superannuation (or pension) on the other hand is 
based on a combination of employer and employee contributions from 
working income. At current (1999) levels, the employer is required by 
law to make a contribution of 7 per cent of the employee’s working 
income and the employee also makes a contribution of 3 per cent. 
Individuals are however allowed to make voluntary contributions 
above the mandatory requirement.  
The low levels of public pension provide strong incentives to remain 
employed. What these changes effectively mean is that part-time and 
casual workers and individuals not in the labour force, face lower 
retirement incomes. As women are already over-represented in the 
lower income part-time labour group, incentives that encourage 
women to withdraw their labour supply during their working years 
imply lower retirement income as well. According to Clare (2000), 
although anyone who earns more than $450 per month is eligible for 
compulsory superannuation contributions, in reality because a 
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significant proportion of women in the part-time and casual labour 
market, they are unlikely to receive the full-benefits of the 
Superannuation guarantee because they may earn less than the 
minimum amount for some months.  
In the section below, we develop a simple two-period model where 
individuals make decisions on labour supply and purchase of child 
care subject to time and day care constraints. These decisions however, 
have implications for their future consumption since retirement 
income is contingent on their pension contributions during their 
working years. Under these circumstances, we examine how 
exogenous changes in taxation and superannuation policies affect 
these choices. 
3. The Model 
The theoretical model considers households with children. It is based 
on the assumption that households derive utility from consumption, 
leisure, and time spent with children. Furthermore, we also assume 
that children require care continuously, there are no supply constraints 
on child care, home-provided child-care is perfectly substitutable with 
professional child care, parents derive positive utility from spending 
time with children and that leisure time is separate from time spent 
with children. Parental retirement income is contingent upon their 
pension contributions during their working years. 
Consider a representative household with two adults who live for two 
periods- working in the first and retired in the second. Assume that 
households have preferences over current and future consumption, 
01 ≥c  and 02 ≥c  respectively; leisure, 0≥l  and time spent with 
their children, 0≥d .  
Following Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998), we assume that while 
female labour force participation decisions are constrained by the 
availability and affordability of child care, male labour force 
participation decisions are generally unconstrained by these issues. 
Therefore, in what follows we assume that 1c  and 2c  refer to female 
consumption in periods one and two. In period one, women work, 
have children and raise them using either their own time or 
professional child care. In the second period, they are retired and 
consume their pension savings acquired through labour market 
participation in period one. 
Household preferences are described by an additively separable utility 
function ),()()( 21 dlgcvcuU ++= ρ , which is strictly concave and 
twice differentable. 
Period one consumption is financed by exogenous household income, 
1Y  and by wage income (net of tax and pension contributions), 
)1)(1( swah −−τ . The ability parameter influences the individual’s 
wage rate, waw ii = , where w denotes the wage rate per efficiency 
unit of labour. Hence, wage income depends on the wage rate, w, an 
ability parameter ai, and hours spent in the labour force, h. The terms τ, 
and s denote taxes and pension contributions respectively. We assume 
that pension contributions are only made by those in paid employment 
and is an exogenously determined proportion of labour income. 
Individuals face both time and child care constraints during their 
working period. The time constraint faced by the working-age parent 
(mother) is:  
dhlT ++≥   (1) 
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where T denotes the total hours available to the parent which could be 
spent consuming leisure (l), in the labour market (h), or in providing 
child care (d). Hence if parents spend d hours in child care, purchased 
child care is: 
dD −=ψ   (2) 
where ψ refers to hours of professional child care purchased at price p 
and D is the total hours of care required by a child. Thus ψ can be re-
written as: 
hl +=ψ   (3) 
i.e., purchased care must also equal hours of work plus leisure. 
Substituting (3) into (1) we have  
d = T – ψ  (4) 
The second period budget constraint is:  
ετ ++−+= )1()1(22 rshwaYc i  (5) 
Second period consumption is financed by exogenous household 
income 2Y ; returns on pension contributions made in the first-period, 
)1( rhswai + ; and a means-tested public pension, ε. Accordingly, only 
those individuals whose first period income is below the basic pension 
amount ε, receive a public pension in the second period equivalent to 
the amount ε.  
Households maximise their utility through choice of h and ψ, subject 
to (2), (4) and (5), which yields the unconstrained maximand: 
)())1()1((
)1)(1()1((
2
1
ψTh,ψgrshwaYvρ
npsτhawτYuU
i
i
−−+++−++
−−−+−=
ετ
ψ
 (6) 
The two first-order conditions with respect to h  and ψ are: 
1: (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0, 0
0, 0
0,
i i
hU u wa s v w a s r g h
h
h T
τ ρ τ′ ′− − + − + − = >
< =
> <
 (7) 
1 2: 0, 0
0, 0
0,
U u pn g g
D
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ
′− + − = >
< =
> <   (8) 
If equation (7) holds with equality, 
1(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
i iu wa s v wa s r gτ ρ τ′ ′− − + − + =   (9) 
The LHS of (9) represents the present marginal value of labour force 
participation and the RHS is the marginal utility of leisure. Hence, 
optimum labour supply is characterised by an equilibrium between the 
marginal benefits and costs of labour force participation.  
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From (8), optimum purchase of professional child care occurs when 
the sum of the marginal disutility of child care costs and the marginal 
utility of leisure equals the marginal utility of spending time spent with 
the child.  
4.  Analysis of the model 
Consider first the two corner solutions: 
Case 1: A household where the mother is working full-time, so that, h 
= T, and therefore l = 0, d = 0, which implies that all child care is 
purchased, ψ=D .  
From (7), if the present marginal value of labour force participation 
exceeds the marginal utility of leisure, 
1(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
i iu wa s v wa s r gτ ρ τ′ ′− − + − + > , then the marginal 
benefits from working outweigh the marginal disutility from working. 
This is likely if the mother has relatively high labour market returns, 
waih or if her marginal utility of leisure is low.  
Further, from (8), it must also be the case that 211 gpnug >− . In other 
words, when marginal utility from leisure net of child care costs is 
greater than the marginal utility of spending time with children, there 
is a greater demand for child-care. 
Case 2: Consider next households where the mother is not employed, h 
= 0, 0)1)(1( =−− shwai τ ; and all child care is provided using 
mother’s time, ψ = 0.  
This is likely if the marginal utility of leisure exceeds the marginal 
present value of labour force participation, i.e. 
1(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
i iu wa s v wa s r gτ ρ τ′ ′− − + − + <  in (7). Further from 
(8), it must also be the case that the marginal utility of spending time 
with the child exceeds the marginal cost of child care and the marginal 
utility of leisure, 211 gpnug <− . This case describes a situation where 
the mother’s opportunity cost of not being in the labour force is low or 
close to zero. 
4b.  Comparative Statics Analysis 
Assuming interior solutions, in the section below, we assess the 
comparative static properties of the model. In particular, we examine 
how changes in policy parameters such as the price of child care, taxes 
and the wage rate affect decisions on female labour supply, h, and 
demand for child care, ψ. All derivations are in the Appendix.  
Consider first the effect of changes in the price of child care on labour 
supply and purchase of child care, summarised in Proposition 1 below: 
Proposition 1: An increase in the price of child care reduces demand 
for child care, but its affect on labour supply cannot be predicted; 
p∂∂ψ  < 0, ph ∂∂  ><  0. 
As expected, the own price effect of an increase in the price of child 
care unambiguously reduces purchase of child care. The increase in 
home-provided child care comes via a reduction in either leisure or 
labour hours, or both.  
However, the impact of higher child care prices on labour supply 
cannot be predicted. This is consistent with the ambiguity found in the 
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empirical literature. For example, while studies by Connelly (1992), 
Schofield and Polette (1998) argue that an increase in child care costs 
has a negative effect on female employment, others such as 
Vandenheuvel (1996), Ribar (1995), Teal (1992) and the ABS (1999) 
disagree.  
Intuitively, this result follows because when child care prices increase, 
there is an income and substitution effect. However, it is not possible 
to predict a priori which of these two effects dominates. First, parents 
may reduce their labour supply, substitute towards greater home-
provided child care and purchase fewer child care hours. In this case, 
leisure hours may remain the same or decrease. Second, the income 
effect of an increase in child care prices reduces parental disposable 
income. They may therefore work longer hours to pay for the higher 
costs. In this case, we cannot predict whether they will purchase more 
child care or substitute away from leisure towards more time in own-
provided child care. If the substitution effect dominates, we expect 
higher child care prices to lead to lower labour supply, i.e ph ∂∂ < 0. 
The opposite is true if the income effect dominates. 
From our comparative static results (A.10 in the Appendix), an 
increase in the price of child care increases labour supply if  
22( )u nW Fψ′′  > 2 12( ( ) )u p n u n Fψ′′ ′− +  (10)  
Proof: See Appendix 
Intuitively, this result is likely if the utility from being in the paid 
labour force outweighs both the disutility of higher child care costs 
and the utility of spending more time with the child. This is likely to 
depend on the skill composition of women. For example, women in 
relatively high paid jobs are less likely to be affected by increases in 
child care costs, relative to those on low paid jobs. However, women 
on low-paid jobs have a low wage, w, relative to the price of child 
care. An increase in child care prices may induce these women to 
reduce their work hours, and perhaps spend a greater amount of time 
with their children. This is reflected as a switch from full-time to part-
time employment. Indeed this is consistent with empirical evidence 
from Australia where according to the ABS (2000), females consitute 
nearly 3/4th of the part-time labour force and of all female employees, 
31.8 per cent are casually employed. It is likely that these women 
reduce their labour supply in order to care for their children, hence 
ph ∂∂  < 0. 
Further, the impact on leisure of an increase in the price of child care 
is unclear. While an increase in the price of child care reduces labour 
supply if (10) holds, we cannot predict whether this leads to greater 
hours of leisure or an increase in demand for child care. From a policy 
point of view, an implication of this result is that government subsidies 
to child care aimed at encouraging greater female labour force 
participation may not have the desired effect in our model. This is 
because lower child care prices may increase the demand for child 
care, but lead to greater leisure consumption rather than higher labour 
supply. 
Proposition 2 below describes the effect of a change in the wage rate 
on labour supply and demand for child care. 
Proposition 2: A change in the wage rate (i) has an ambiguous effect 
on both labour supply and demand for child care; w∂∂ψ  ><  0, 
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wh ∂∂  ><  0; (ii) causes demand for child care and labour supply to 
move in the same direction. 
Proof: See Appendix 
According to our comparative static results, a change in the wage rate 
has an ambiguous effect on both labour supply and child care. As in 
the previous case, an increase in the wage rate has both an income and 
a substitution effect on labour supply. An increase in the wage rate 
raises real purchasing power, and since both leisure and child care are 
normal goods, cause people to consume more of both. However, an 
increase in the wage rate also raises the opportunity cost of leisure and 
own-provided child care. This may lead to a substitution away from 
leisure and time spent with children towards longer working hours. 
Which of these two effects dominates cannot be predicted. 
What is the joint impact of a change in the wage rate on both labour 
supply and demand for child care? A priori when the wage rate 
increases, there are four possibilities: both labour supply and demand 
for child care may increase; both labour supply and demand for child 
care may decrease; labour supply may increase while the demand for 
child care decreases and finally labour supply may decrease while 
demand for child care increases.  
However, our comparative static results show that in response to an 
increase in the wage rate, it can never be the case that labour supply 
and demand for child care move in opposite directions. For example, 
while a rise in the wage rate increases labour force participation, it also 
increases demand for child care. The opposite also holds true. 
Next we examine the impact of a change in the marginal tax rate on 
labour supply and purchase of child care. 
Proposition 3: Suppose that GW < iu wa′ , then τ∂∂h , τψ ∂∂ < 0.  
Accordingly, if the marginal utility of wage income is greater than the 
change in marginal utility of net income from period 1, then higher 
marginal tax rates reduce both labour supply and demand for child 
care.  
From our comparative static results, the effect of an increase in the 
marginal tax rate on labour supply and purchase of child care is 
ambiguous. By reducing the opportunity cost of working, higher taxes 
encourage a greater substitution towards leisure or time with children. 
On the other hand, an increase in the marginal tax rate also reduces 
real income and in some situations may lead women to increase their 
labour supply to maintain the target income level.  
Hence an increase in the marginal tax rate generates a substitution 
effect, which leads to a substitution towards greater home provided 
child care and possibly higher leisure hours.  
5.  Uncertainty in second-period consumption 
A simple extension of the model is to incorporate the possibility of 
uncertainty in second period consumption due to a greater probability 
of divorce. We assume that in the event of divorce, retirement income 
for women is substantially reduced. We further assume that 
households are risk-averse. Therefore while (1) remains unchanged, 
(2) now incorporates the probability of divorce. Individuals now face 
the prospect, ),:1,( 22 YkYππ − , where π and (1-π), are the 
probabilities attached to the occurrence of the divorce and non-divorce 
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states respectively. Household income in the second period is 2kY  if a 
divorce occurs and 2Y  otherwise, where 22 YkY < . 
Define the notation: 
ετ
ετ
++−+=
++−+=
)1()1(
)1()1(
22
22
rshwaYc
rshwakYc
iH
iL
        (11) 
where Lc2  and 
Hc2  refer to consumption in the divorced and the non-
divorced state respectively, and since 22 YkY < , it follows that 
HL cc 22 < . Substituting (11) for C2 the expected utility function 
becomes: 
1
2
2
( (1 ) (1 )(1 ) )
( ( (1 ) (1 ) )
(1 ) ( (1 ) (1 ) ))
( )
i
i
i
EU u Y τ w a h τ s p n
ρ v kY wa h s r
v Y wa h s r
g ψ h, T ψ
ψ
π τ ε
π τ ε
= − + − − −
+ + − + +
+ − + − + +
+ − −
        (12) 
First-order conditions with respect to h and ψ are: 
0))1()1()(1(
)1()1((()1)(1(:
1 =−+−−+
+−′+−−′
grswa
rswavswauU
i
ii
h
τπ
τπρτ
 (16) 
0: 21 =−+′− ggpnuUψ  (17) 
Proposition 4: An increase in the probability of divorce leads to both 
higher labour force participation and a greater use of professional 
child care, i.e., both .0, >∂∂∂∂ πψπh   
Proof: See Appendix 
The intuition for this result is straightforward. An increase in the 
probability of divorce increases the uncertainty associated with second 
period income. Hence women prefer staying employed, and as a 
consequence they purchase more child care.  
6.   Conclusions 
This paper has examined the effect of changes in the price of child 
care, wage rate and taxes on incentives to work and purchase child 
care in the context of a life-cycle model. The inclusion of leisure into 
the analysis has interesting implications on demand for child care and 
labour supply. 
The model demonstrates that while higher child care costs lead to a 
decrease in demand for child care, its impact on labour supply cannot 
be determined a priori. From a policy point of view, this result has 
important implications since it suggests that reduction in child care 
prices directed towards encouraging greater female employment, may 
not have its desired effect. This is because lower child care prices may 
increase the demand for child care, but lead to greater leisure 
consumption rather than higher labour supply. 
Our model also shows that in response to a change in the wage rate, 
labour supply and demand for child care always move in the same 
direction. An increase in labour supply leads to greater demand for 
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child care. However, the reduction in work hours associated with an 
increase in the tax rate, leads women to purchase greater child care 
hours and spend more time consuming leisure. 
Finally, our model has important implications for retirement income. 
Our model predicts that an increase in the probability of divorce leads 
to higher labour force participation and a greater purchase of 
professional child care.  
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Appendix 
A.i Second-order conditions 
The second order conditions are satisfied when 02122211 >− FFF . Using (7) and (8) 
2
2 2
11 112 ( (1 )(1 )) ( (1 ) (1 )) 0
i iUF u wa s v wa s r g
h
τ ρ τ∂ ′′ ′′≡ = − − + − + + =∂  (A.1) 
2
2
22 22 12 112 ( ) 2 0
UF u pn g g gψ
∂ ′′≡ = + − + =∂  (A.2) 
2 2
12 21 12 11( (1 )(1 )) 0
iU UF F u pn wa s g g
h h
τψ ψ
∂ ∂ ′′≡ = ≡ = − − − + − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (A.3) 
From (A.1)-(A.4) since 0, 2211 <FF  and 0, 2112 >FF , the second order conditions are 
satisfied. Hence 0>J . 
A.2: Comparative statics 
Totally differentiating (7) and (8) with respect to p, τ and w yields the following system 
of equations: 
[ (1 )(1 ) ]iu wa s n dpτ ψ′′− − −
2 2[ (1 ) (1 ) ( (1 )) ( (1 )) ( (1 )) (1 )]i iu wa s v was r u wa s h v wa s r h dτ τ τ′ ′ ′′ ′′+ − − − + − − − − + − +
2 2[ ( (1 )(1 )) (1 )(1 ) ( (1 ) (1 ))
(1 ) (1 )]
i i i
i
u wh a s u a s v hw a s r wh
v a s r dw
τ τ ρ τ
ρ τ
′′ ′ ′′− − + − − + − + +
′ − +  (A.4) 
 
2[ ( ) ]u p n u n dpψ′′ ′− -[ (1 )(1 ) ]iu a s n dτ τ′′ − − [ (1 )(1 )]iu pna h s dwτ′′− − −  (A.5) 
Define Srsai ≡+− )1()1( τ  and Wsai ≡−− )1)(1( τ , where G < 0 and S, 0>W . 
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Proposition 1: Effect of changes in price of child care and wage rate on labour 
supply and purchase of child care decisions 
Using A.1 and A.2 and applying Cramer’s Rule we get: 
11 12
2
21 22 ( )
h
F F p u W n
F F u p n u n
p
∂
∂ ψ
∂ψ ψ
∂
   ′′     =    ′′ ′  − +     
 (A.6) 
We then have, 
2
22 12( ) ( ( ) )u nW F u p n u n Fh
p J
ψ ψ′′ ′′ ′− − +∂ =∂
><  0 (A.7) 
2
11 21( ( ) ) ( )u p n u n F u W n F
p J
ψ ψψ ′′ ′ ′′− + −∂ =∂  <0 (A.8) 
Since 0,, 111122 <uFF  and 0,,,,,,, 12112 >nSpWuFF ψ , ph ∂∂  ><  0, and 0<∂∂ pψ . 
From (A.7), the sign of ph ∂∂  depends on whether 22( )u nW Fψ′′  ><  
2
12( ( ) )u p n u n Fψ′′ ′− + .  
The LHS of the above expression is the product of the change in net marginal benefits 
from being employed and the change in marginal utility of child care, whereas the RHS 
is the sum of the marginal disutility of child care costs and the marginal utility of 
children multiplied by a change in marginal utility of labour supply from an increase in 
purchase of child care. If the LHS > RHS, an increase in the price of child care 
increases labour supply. 
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Proof of Proposition 2: Effect of change in the wage rate on labour supply and 
purchase of child care 
From A.1 and A.2 and applying Cramer’s rule, 
11 12
21 22
( ( ) ( )
h
F F W u u Wwh S v whS vw
F F u pnhW
w
∂
ρ∂
∂ψ
   ′ ′′ ′′ ′ − + + +  =     ′′     ∂ 
 
12 1 22[ ( ) ( )]u pnhWF W u Wh u S v whS v Fh
w J
ρ′′ ′′ ′′ ′− − + + +∂ =∂
><  0 (A.9) 
11 21[ ( ) ( )]u pnhWF W u Wh u S v whS v F
w J
ρψ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′+ + + +∂ =∂
><  0 (A.10) 
Let Wu Svρ′ ′+  = A, u pnhW′′  = B and 2 2( ) ( )u W h v wh Sρ′′ ′′+ = a 
Divide the numerators in (A.9) and (A.10) by F22 and F21 respectively. 
0>∂∂ wh  if aFFBA >+ )( 2212  and 0<∂∂ wψ  if aFFBA >+ )( 2111 . 
Simplifying further, 0>∂∂ wh  and 0<∂∂ wψ  only if 21112212 FFFF >  
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Proof of Proposition 3: Effect of a change in marginal tax rate on labour supply 
and purchase of child care  
Using (A.5) and (A.6), 
2
11 12
21 22
(1 ) ( (1 )) (1 )( )i i i
h
F F u wa s u wa h s wa s r v v whS
F F u pnhW
∂
∂τ
∂ψ
τ
   ′ ′′ ′ ′′ − + − + + +  =     ′′     ∂ 
 (A.11) 
Applying Cramer’s Rule, 
2
22 12[ (1 ) ( (1 )) (1 )( )]
i i iu wa s u wa h s wa s r v v whS F u pnhWFh
Jτ
′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′′− + − + + + −∂ =∂
><  0
 (A.12) 
2
11 21[ (1 ) ( (1 )) (1 )( )]
i i iu pnhWF u wa s u wa h s wa s r v v whS F
J
ψ
τ
′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′− − + − + + +∂ =∂  
><  0
 (A.13) 
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Proposition 4: Effect of an increase in probability of divorce on labour supply and 
purchase of child care 
Using and , the second-order conditions are: 
2
2 2
11 2
2
11
( (1 )(1 )) ((1 ) (1 ) (1 ))
( (1 ) (1 )) 0
i i
i
UF u wa s v wa s r
h
wa s r g
τ ρ π τ
π τ
∂ ′′ ′′≡ = − − + − − +∂
+ − + + <
 (A.14) 
2
2
22 22 12 112 ( ) 2 0
UF u pn g g gψ
∂ ′′≡ = + − + =∂  (A.15) 
2 2
12 21 12 11( (1 )(1 )) 0
iU UF F u pn wa s g g
h h
τψ ψ
∂ ∂ ′′≡ = ≡ = − − − + − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  (A.16) 
From (A.14)-(A.16) since 0, 2211 <FF  and 0, 2112 >FF , the second order conditions are 
satisfied. Hence 0>J . 
Totally differentiating (11) and (12) with respect to π and applying Cramer’s rule, 
2 2 22( ) 0
L Hv c c Fh
J
ρ
π
′′ −∂ = >∂  (A.17) 
2 2 21( ) 0
L Hv c c F
J
ρψ
π
′′− −∂ = >∂  (A.18) 
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Table 1: Female employment trends in Australia- 1989-1999 
 
 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Females (of total labour 
force) 
40.8 41.4 41.9 42.7 43.1 43.3 
Females in the labour 
force with children 
aged 0-4 years (of all 
females with children 
aged 0-4 years) 
44.0 44.5 45.3 49.3 47.7 47.1 
Part-time workers (of 
total employed) 
20.1 21.7 23.5 24.4 25.2 26 
Male part-time workers 
(of total male 
employed) 
7.2 8.5 10.2 10.9 11.7 12.5 
Female part-time 
workers (of total female 
employed) 
38.9 40.2 41.7 42.5 42.9 43.5 
Female part-time 
workers (of total part-
time employed) 
78.6 77.2 75.1 74.5 73.7 72.7 
Males casually 
employed (of all male 
employees) 
13.1 13.5 16.4 18.5 20.9 22 
Females casually 
employed (of all female 
employees) 
29.3 29 30.6 30.8 31.7 31.8 
Source: ABS. Australian Social Trends 2000, Cat. 4102.0 
 
